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Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 38, Folder 29, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) 
For Release P , M.'s,~Ht~t ~;,_.s-6 
R E V I E 'i ' ( F F ) R E I G N ? 0 L 1 C Y - V I I 
U 1'1 I T E D S T A T E S F ') l I C Y A N D A C H A f\l G I N G E U R C P E 
Mr. President: 
As the Senate ~<nows, I have b een presenting during the current 
session a series of cbservations on the international situation. ,Phcn I began 
this series some months ago , it seemed to me that a need existed for a general 
review of conditions throuGhout the world and the prob lems which these conditions 
po se for cur fo reign policy. 
Y'e have witnessed m any changes in the internatio nal situation during 
the past year. If our foreign policy is to serve the peace and well - being o f the 
United States, it must keep pace with thet>e changes. It must be adjusted when 
and where the need for adjustment exists. 
Essential adjustm ents are not likely to be made, however, without 
public understanding of the issues involved. Nor are they likely to be made 
unless the Government is willing to face these issues with perception, with 
ho nesty and with c o urage. 
The initiative for change in foreign policy must come largely from 
the Executive Branch because of the s pecial obligations of the President in this 
ccnnection. But we in Congress, in the Senate, are not without our own 
responsibilities under the Cons titution to speak out, t o advise, and to consent on 
foreign policy . 
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That tho ugh t has prc ;n pted this 11 Review of Foreign Policy". In 
previous remarks I have dealt with the situatio n in Southeast Asia, North 
Africa, the Middle East, the Vestern He mispherc and the African Continent. In 
these addresses I have been attempting to bring to the attention of the Senate what 
I believed to be the essential facts respecting each region and the co urse which 
this country has followed in coping with tthose facts. Where possible, I have 
advanced suggestions in the hope that they might be helpful in improving our 
po licies, 
This series is no w drawing to a close. Before completing it, I want 
to co nsider the areas which have been, in effect, the main concentrations of 
American po licy du r ing the past decade . One of these areas is Europe. It is the 
situation in that continent -- the changing situation in that continent - - that I wish 
to cover in my remarks today . 
Our relations with Europe are of vital importance to us not only in 
themselves but also in their influence on our policies elsewhere . I have 
discus sed at length in previous statements how considerations arising out of the 
European situation color our policies in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia 
and other areas. Sometimes, in my judgment, these adjustments of policy have 
been valid, or at least understandable, and in others they have not been. I shall 
notre-describe this inter-relationship at length today. I believe it sufficient at 
this point Merely to reemphasize the fact that we have not infrequently taken 
major positions elsewhere which we woul d probably not have taken except out o f 
concern for the attitudes and interests of the countries of We stern Europe. That 
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such is the case is an indicator of the indirect significance of E'urope in our total 
policy. 
As for the importance of our direc t relations with the Eur opean con-
tinent, Members of the Senate are well aware that this country has participated in 
two major wars, both of which originated largely in crises in Europe. They know, 
too, that the bulk of our post-war expenditures for foreign aid have been directed 
to that continent and that some of our most extensive military commitments for 
mutual defense have Likewise been undertaken in concert with the European 
nations. 
It is obvious, therefore, that E'urope lies close to the core of our 
foreign policy . There are many reasons why that is the case. To the extent 
that they are valid reasons, they add up to this: The freedom, the peace and the 
well-being of this nation can be profoundly 
transpires in the lands across the Atlantic. 
decisively - - influenced by what 
I have no desire to revive the old and tattered debate as to whether 
Europe is more, less or equally as important as the Far Fast in our foreign 
relations . In any event, I intend to dea l with the latter region at a later time . 
let me say now, though, that in the modern world, for better or for worse, we 
cannot insulate this nation against the tremendous impact of European develop -
ments on our security and well-being . 
Just one example should suffice to demonstrate why that is so. Our 
budget for national defense this year is 40 billion dollars. That is the sum which 
the American people take out of their earnings and their wages to support our 
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army, navy and air force. It is a heavy burden but we sustain it for the sake o f 
the safety o f the nation. 
·vre might well asl< ourselves what that burden wo uld be, what would 
c0me ,)Ut of our earnings and wages for national defense if the countries of 
Western Europe were not free, if they were not linked in peaceful ties with the 
United States. Suppose, instead, the great productive capacity, the skills and 
genius of that region had been impelled into a hostile totalitarian camp after 
World War II. What would be the levy on ourselves for national defense at the 
present time? Eighty billion dollars? Twice the present burden? Three times? 
Is it not probable that the levy would have also included the cost of a third world 
war and that we might now be living awid its ruins if indeed we were living at all? 
When we become irked with the responsibilities of foreign policy and especially 
those which relate to Europe, these are some of the questions that we would do 
well to aslc ourselves . 
Nor is defense -- mutual security -- the sole basis for the great 
significance of Eur ope in our foreign relations . Are we so prosperous, so self-
sufficient in an economic sense that we can dismiss lightly an annual trade with 
Vlestern Europe of $7. 5 billion? How many jobs, what return to American 
ind'.lstry and agriculture does this trade represent? 
Can we, finally, ienore the contributicn in science, religion and art 
which Europe has made and can continue to make to our national progress? To 
cite just one specific example, he w many years might it have taken for us to 
develop atomic energy without the work of Ein s te in, Fermi and other European 
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scientists? Without their contribution, would we have achieved atomic weapons 
before enemies bent on our destruction during World War II? 
There is no need to labor the point, Mr. President, It is clear that 
many bonds, both visible and invisible, stretch across the ocean between Europe 
and America. They are, for the most part, useful and mutually helpful bonds. 
They may rub us uncomfortably and irritatingly at times, I have no doubt that 
the Europeans suffer similar adverse effects on occasion. Relations among 
nations are not much different in this respect than among human beings. If I may 
use a word which the Secretary of State has popularized in recent months, how-
ever, it is the "totality" of the relationship that counts. 
Most Americans, I believe, are aware that in this totality, there is 
an important identity of interest between the European nations and the United 
States. Our foreign policy over the past decade has interpreted this awareness 
with great fidelity. The M:arshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Crganization, the restoration of a free Western Germany within the 
Western community -- these measures are the highlights of a policy that has 
continually expressed the deep interest, the enlightened self-interest of this 
nation, in the survival and strengthening of a free Europe. 
I am sure many rr>istakes have been made during this post-war period 
in carrying out our policy with respect to Europe, some noticed, some unnoticed. 
Mistakes will always be made s o long as foreign relations continue to be 
co nducted by human beings. It will be so with Der.1ocrats as well as with 
Republicans. 
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Let us by all means take reasonable precautions against mistakes 
and recognize and correct them when they arc made. But let us not bec0me so 
obsessed with mistakes that we dry up the well-springs of courage and initiative 
which this country must have to adapt to the international life of our times . 
Nor should we in an unseemly eagerness to find fault with ourselves 
and others ignore the fact that the enormous achievements of past policy would 
not have been possible without some risk and irritation. Let us ask ourselves 
what our national position would now be if we had not dared to help the free 
European nations to recover from V'orld War II. What would our 3ituation be had 
we not interposed the strength of this country between an exhausted Europe and 
the expansionist dreams of the power -mad dictator to the East? 
I believe the citizens of this country know that intelligent foreign 
policies eve r the past decade, mistakes and irritations notwithstanding, have 
done much to preserve freedom and peace in Western Europe and, in so doing, 
have served the deepest interests o f the United States. 
If doubts as to the effectivenes:> of our foreign policy are now 
developing, Mr. President, it is because there has appeared in this government 
a tendency to seek refuge in the security of successful past pol ides rather than 
to explore the unknown o f new policies, an exploration which is essential to meet 
the changing pattern of the international situation. The past can guide. It can 
provide a base on which to build. But foreign policies effective once do not 
remain effective forever. If they are to serve the interests of this nation, they 
must remain a vital element in our national life. They may evolve out of the 
past but they cannot idle in the past. 
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A policy that served the American people in 1')45 was no longer 
entirely applicable in l 950 . \'!hat was helpful in 1953 can be a hindrance in 1956 
unless we adjus t it to the realities of 1956, 
These realities with respect to Europe are vastly different than 
they were just a short time ago. The European situation is changing and it is 
changing rapidly. The changes, as I understand them, Mr . President, radiate 
from three principal geographic sources, from within Western Europe, from 
within the Soviet system in ,'{es tern Europe and fr om within the whole of Germany. 
Cur policies, however, have been slow to accept the fact of change in 
Europe. They have gone on in the old familiar patterns , It is only in recent 
weeks, with the Secretary of State in this country, that there have been sign~ of 
an awakening o n the part of the Executive Braach to the need for adjustments . 
Unfortunately, the hour is already late. 
Press correspondents and other observers have long been alert to the 
emergence of new trends in Europe and they have reported them accurately and 
pro mptly to the American public. Members of Congress have also noted these 
trends in their missions abroad. The Executive Branch, however, despite the 
vast and costly array of information-gathering facilities at its command, seems 
to be the last to learn the truth. I wonder sometimes at the efficacy of these 
facilities or at least at the capacity of the responsible authorities in the Executive 
Branch to act on the info rmation which they may supply . 
In appraising the changes in Eur ope, Mr . President, I should like to 
turn first to the area which is of most direct concern to us, to Western Europe. 
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Since the end of World ".far II cur policy has been aimed at the pref:crvation of 
freedom in that area. It has also sought closer collaboration as among the 
Western European democracies themselves and with us and ethers in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organizatton . 
For reasons of which I have already spoken, these have been valid 
cbjectivcs of American policy. ')ur people, expressing themselves through 
Congress, have consistently supported them. The Europeans, other than the 
Communists, have generally welcomed t.hem . 
It is not difficult to find evidence of the success of this policy of 
support of freedom and close collaboration in Western Europe . The region has 
not only recovered from V!orld 'l!ar II in an economic sense but has recove r ed so 
thoroughly that its peoples are reaching out for new and unprecedented standards 
of living. The Europeans now have mo re military strength to resist the pressures 
of totalitarianism from without and within . They have also moved a considerable 
distance towards integration as among themselves. ·vrith other free nations, 
moreover, they have participated in building up the commc.n defense structure 
of NATO. 
A casual observer, Mr . President, might find the picture I have jusc 
drawn a most encouraging one. It is. The only trouble with it, howevt!r, is that 
it is incomplete. 
Progress in ~'/estern Europe has indeed been real and extensive but 
it has not been unalloyed. There are shadows as well as highlights in the 
situation and it is a function of res ponsiule government to bring both to the 
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attention of the American people. If the Executive Branch is unable to paint a 
full and accurate picture cf our predicament -- the dark as well as the light - -
the Senate is not without capacity to do so . I hope that my colleagues will not 
attribute to me a dour outlook on life if I now make an effort in that direction with 
respect to :Jestern Europe. 
I should like to turn first to the question of V'lestern European integra-
tion. I noted a moment ago that \.he ·'{estern European nations had made consider-
able progress in that direction over the past decade. For many reasons, that 
progress is of greatest importance to the future of Europe. In the first place, 
integration is a key to the end of the suicidal wars which have torn at the vitals 
of Yves tern civilization over the past century. Furthermore, it is a key to the 
rising standards of living which the peoples of v.Testcrn Europe are demanding 
with increasing insistence from their political and economic systems. Integra-
tion is important, finally, because, together, the European nations will be able 
to maintain, in greater security, a higher degree of freedom than each could 
ever expect to do alone . 
We ought not to underestimate the difficulties which confront the 
nations of 'ivestern Europe in a further march towards unity. The vested 
interests which conspire against it are great . The suspicions are ancient. The 
fears are deep. 
Without underestimating these difficulties, however, we should also 
recognize the urgent necessity of overcoming them. A united Europe is not only 
the great promise of the Twentieth Century for the people of that continent . It 
may well be their last hope of free survival. 
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Unfortunately, M r. President, after moving forward impressively 
with such underta!cings as the Coal and Steel Community and W'estern European 
Union, Furopc may now be retreat1ng from the goal. Certainly, the moment is 
long overdue for further progres:) in the integration of power facilities, trans-
portation, markets and currencies. 
The great test of the future of unity in Europe may well come in the 
matte r cf atomic energy. I s there sufficient strength in the concept of 
Europeanisrn to harness the creative talents of European science and industry 
in a common ef!ort to develop this great new source of power? Is there real 
prospect for the acceptance of some such plan as Euratom? If there is not, it is 
not too difficult to envision the end of the surface prosperity and c0operation 
which the Western European nations now enjoy in a new outbreak of cutthroat 
nationalistic rivalries. 
In the larger grouping of the free nations in NA TC the same shadows 
of divisiveness that have appeared in Vfestern Europe are also apparent. A 
deadlock over Cyprus has turned allies against one another in terroristic out-
breaks and repri!ials. The dispute has disrupted the eastern defense structure 
of NATO and jeopardized the stability of the entire Middle East . 
Mr. President, I know that this country, standing outside the conflict, 
cannot fully apprecia te the interests and attachments which are at stake in 
Cyprus f.n British, Greeks and Turks. Are the stakes so important, can they 
be so important, that they are each prepared to gamble their own future and the 
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common future of NATC on a trial by continued strife? Can there be greater 
risks to any of them in a resumption of negotiations or the acceptance of the 
conciliation of friendly nations? 
Beyond Cyprus and the similar distracting difficulties of the French 
in North Africa, lies the whole question of the erosion not only of the military 
structure of NATO but of the very concept of NATO itself. There are some who 
attribute this erosion to the decline of the danger of Soviet military aggression in 
Europe and to the outdating of the organization by the development of new nuclear 
weapons. I think it more accurate, Mr . President, to attribute it to an excess ive 
eagerness on the part of other free nations and ourselves to discard the irksome 
burdens of preserving peace. When I was in Europe last fall, I noted this 
tendency which was already strong in the wake of the Geneva conference. I made 
this observation with respect to it in a public report to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations: 
''If we confuse an atmosphere of peace with the 
actuality of peace we have no one to blame but ourselves. 
If we rush to disarm before agreements on disarmament 
with proper safeguards have been achieved, the fault is our 
own. If at the first sign of peace each of the nations in the 
'/!estern alliance begins to pursue policies which ignore 
the needs of the others, it will not require any great 
skill on the part of the Soviet Union to disintegrate NATO 
and the other instruments of Western unity. They will soon 
fall apart of their own accord.'' 
In making that observation, Mr. President, I did not mean to imply 
that NATO should be regarded as something sacrosanct. Certainly, changes in 
that o rganization should be made and they should be made promptly, if they are 
necessary. Military structures are not designed to last unchanged in perpetuity. 
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The dangers to NATO do nol lie in an intelligent adjustment o f its 
strategy and its requirements to a changing situation. The dangers lurk in 
haphazard adjustment, in changes dictated not by political and military realities, 
but by wishful thinking and the unilateral pursuit of short-range mterests by 
member-states. 
Even if the threat of Soviet aggression has receded, even if, as some 
speculate, mutual possession of super-bombs has now given us the cold comfort 
of a peace of "mutual terror" - - even if that were the case, is the need for 
Weste rn cooperation any less pressing? If the concept of NATO·.·' ::. ·.·! ·:-· !'" 
' ; · · r · -- the concept of the mutual defense of free nations -- is obscured, how 
long will it be before new threats to these nations will arise from outside or 
perhaps even from within the group itself:? 
There are some who contend that NATO is essentially negative in 
purpose, that the survival of the organization depends on the existence of a 
specific and incipient military danger. Certainly, the Soviet threat was a factor 
in the creation of the NATO but is it the only factor? Have we forgotten that 
twice in this century, our civilization has skirted the edge of doom, that twice 
our heritage has been tossed recklessly into the fires of war, by conflicts which 
began within VTeste rn Europe and spread their great damage in that region? 
Communism fed on these conflagrations. After the wars the Communists probed 
among the charred and smoking ruins and tore down nations and ideals which had 
been severely weakened by the conflicts . That is the destructive role which 
communisr.n has occupied in the contemporary world and we must not lose sight 
-not 
of it. By the same token, however, il is essential/to obscure the fact that the 
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greatest damage to the free natic ns has been largely self-1nflicted. It has re-
s uited fr o m their own inner disunity, and partict>larly the disunity of the \i-'estern 
European regio n. 
Both great wars o f this century in the first instance were atlempted 
suicides on the part of vlestcrn Europe . The critlcal danger of totalitarianism 
came after, no t before, these massive assaults which the region launched upon 
itself. And only as a way is found to cope with tendenc:iel:i of this kind will the 
free nations develo p real security against comm1mism and other forms of 
to tali tarianis m. 
That is why, for years, many of us have urged that attention be 
directed to the positive side of NATO . The recent pro posal of the Secretary of 
3tate to develop the "totality" of NATO is a step in that direction but it is a 
belated and halting step and may well have produced only a 1oirage. When this 
matter was discussed at the May meeting of the NATO Council, scarcely 15 min-
utes was devoted to it and it appears as though the proposal were already on the 
~ 
way to bein~n the bureaucratic side-issue of which agency or organization shall 
do what. 
What is fundamental is not whether NATO itself is reinforced in its 
rwn-military aspects or other non-military organs of ,:'/estern cooperation are 
given greater vitality. V!hat ~important is that the NATO nations retain and 
strengthen that unity of outlook on which the freedom of each ultimately depends . 
v'!hat ~important is that they continue to express this unity in deeds. vlhat is 
impc rtant is that they continue to search out and develop means by which free 
governments, working together, can better serve their citizens and their comn~on 
inte rests. 
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The free nations need this strength of common purposes now more than 
ever before. We; need :t because the changes which arc tak1ng place within the 
Soviet bloc will confront us with great dangers and great opportunities in the 
months and years ahead. Th~se changes are not of r<;cent vintage. They have 
been maturing at least since the death of Stalin. But w..; have been slow in this 
instance, as in the case of v'.Jestern Europe, to recognize the fact. 
It is not yet clear what these changes will produce within the Soviet Union, 
whether they are forerunners of fundamental shifts in the Communist system or 
simply the prelude to a new and tighter tyranny. We would do well, in any 
event, not to become overly fascinated by the thrilling mystery stories that 
are bemg published by the present Soviet leaders. Absorbed in this literature 
of escapism, we are overlooking the fact that the meaning of the changes is al-
ready becoming abundantly clear in the area that is of gr~atest importance to us. 
That is the area of Soviet relations with other nations. 
In that area, the changes add up to a vast effort to push the interests of 
Soviet communism not by the crude tactics of a Stalin but by the traditional 
techniques of d1P.omacy, trade and exchange . In commenting on these changes 
two years ago in the Senate, I noted: 
"There are great stakes involved .... Here it is 
not a matter of a few r esources, a few strategic positions and a 
reluctant people being seized by the Communists and dragged 1nto 
their camp. . . . . The willing allegiance or the benevolent 
neutrality of entire nations is involved . 
"The Communists arc striving by a combwation of 
diplomacy and economic enticements to drive the free nations 
further and further apart and to draw as many of them as possible 
into their orbit or into an intermediate stage of neutralism. " 
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If we continue to blind ourselves to the power of these new tactics, we 
shall do so only at our own risk. It is inexcusable to fail to recognize the 
impact which they are already producing through-out the world. Their effects 
are felt in Asia, iu Europe, in Latin America and in Africa. The tactics 
register, even in such ancient enemies of Soviet communism as Iran, Spain, 
and Japan. In Europe, communist parties begin to take on a new respectability, 
and if present trends continue, it may not be long before 'united fronts'' again 
appear in the European parliaments. 
Let us face the dimensions of the threat of these new tactics in all 
honesty. They appeal to a world sick of war and the threat of war. They appeal 
to nations with a great need to enlarge their trade if they are even to maintain 
living standards which in some cases arc but a small fraction of what we have 
in this country. They appeal to countries anxious to speed up their technical 
progress. 
It is precisely because they do appeal in this fashion that the Soviet 
tactics present such a danger to freedom. They draw independent nations away 
from the resp:>nsibilities of preserving fXlace. They permit wedges to be driven 
between these nations. They move poverty-stricken, underdeveloped countries 
into closer alinement with Soviet totalitariansim. We cannot stop this trend 
either by sanctimonious admonitions or by efforts to outbid the Soviet Union in 
enticements. In some instances, experience is the only teacher of the truth 
and we shall have to wait until the lessons are learned. 
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If the shift in Soviet tactics creates these dangers to freedom, it also 
opens up opportunities. If we ~ are neither disconcerted, discouraged or 
divided by the sudden Russian emergence into the free world, if W>e do not 
cower i11 the face of the dangers which it produccs, we may yet be able to seize 
these opportunities. If we have the courage and the initiative which freedom 
demands of its adherents, we may find that the door of the closed totalitarian 
world which has now swung outward may also be made to swing inward. The 
Soviet Uni.on may discover that it cannot travel out into the world of freedom 
and expect the repressed states of Eastern Euro~ to remain obediently at 
home. 
If we are to take the opp:>rtunities which may follow in the wake of the 
changes within the Soviet bloc, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the aims of 
totalitarian communism do not change. We must keep clearly in mind that 
totalitarianism survives only by feeding its fears and ambitions in an ever-widen-
ing tasture of domination. 
It will do us little good, though, to repeat the fact that th.:.: goals of 
communism do not change, as though it were some sort of htany, if we fail 
to recognize at the same time that many roads lead to Communist domination. 
The goals of the Communists do not change but the ways in which they seek the 
goals do change and have changed. 
Until now, we have keyed our policies larg ely to meet a sudden Soviet 
military thrust to world domination and we must continue to be prepared for that 
contingency. But can we ignore any longer the fact that Communist progress 
towards that goal is now being registered by means othe1· than military? 
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If the day ever comes when free men no longer have the will to rise 
together to meet a military challenge, on that day freedom will begin to die. 
In the same fashion, if the day ever comes when free men can rise together 
only to meet a military challenge, on that day freedom will have lost its meaning. 
It is small comfort, therefore, that w~ have built high the walt of 
military containment only to find that communist totalitarianism moves up, 
around, and und~r the wall with the tools of economic penetration .and diplomatic 
maneuver. 
Nowhere is the danger of Soviet achievement in this connection greater 
than in the third zone of great change in Europe, in Germany. We have watched 
that nation rise up out of the ruins of World War II, to become once again a 
powerful and independent force, the decisive force in the fate of Europe. 
Until now, Germany has looked to the West. Are we, however , on the 
verge of witnessing a great shift? 
The pressures for change are rising in Germany . They are rising out 
of the issue of frustrated umficatlon. They are rising out of resistance to 
rearmament and military commitments to NATO. They are rising out of the 
search for economic and trade oppntunities in the east. They are rising out 
of the dying promise of Western European unity . 
These pressures, lv·r. President, I believe, are turning the outlook of 
Germany away from the .Vest, not toward the East but perhaps 1nward and back-
ward to a past built on neutralism and revival of nationalistic excess. The fact 
that this past is underscored with disaster for Germany and Europe, as Chancellor 
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Adenauc-r and others in the Bottr:l government knO\V only too well, may not be a 
sufficient deterrent. The pressures for change may be too powerful even for 
an Adenauer to curb, especially 1f the Soviet Union should choose to throw mto 
the situation the di}iomatic and other resources of its new taches at a critical 
moment. 
This country has rested its policies respecting Germany on the shoulders 
of one man, a great and able man. The Soviet Union, however, is in a position 
to align its policies with the tremendous forces that are at work in Germany, 
forces with historical roots that go back decades and centuries, forces which 
will be in operation long after the Chancellor and every Member of this chamber 
have gone. 
As I noted in rem arks appended to the Record in 1954: 
"The Russians could withdraw their occupation forces 
and expand the nucleus of German militarism which already exists 
in the East German communits army. They could, in other words, 
offer Germany a unification with real nationalistic inducements and 
ask in return only that the Germans separate themselves from Western 
Europe. 11 
The flexibility of Soviet di}iomacy has placed the Russians in a position 
to manipulate a development of that kind. They control the East German govern-
ment and they have di}iomatic relations with Bonn. They have begun, in recent 
weeks, the withdrawal of their occupation forces from Germany. 
Will they now go further and accept the Bonn government as a nucleus 
of political control for all Germany and ask only that a place be made for the 
communist-trained East German army in the new Reich? Will they acquiesce 
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in expanded German trade with the countries of Eastern Europe, the countries 
which lie along the road from Berlin to Istanbul, a traditional line of German 
commercial ~netration? 
1 do not know how far the Russians will go. 1 believe, however, that they 
witt go to great lengths to dissolve the bonds which hold together the free nations, 
from Greece and Turkey to Scandinavia, and to reduce the influence of the United 
States on the European continent and in surrounding areas . 
Mr. President, I have sought in my remarks to survey the changes 
which confront Amer1can policy with respect to Europe. What we see today are 
only the dim outlines of what may take place in the months and years ahead. 
Unless we act to preserve and strengthen the basic foundation of freedom and 
peace in Europe, the floodgates wilt surely open, and the tidal wave will over-
whelm 1ruch of the constructive effort of the past decade. It will carry away the 
promise of unit in Western Europe. It will cover NATO, It will drive American 
influence from Europe; it will prepare the ground for totalitarianism and a World 
War III. 
There may still be an opportunity to forestall this sequence of events. 
But we shall miss the opportunity if we comfort ourselves with a pleasant portrait 
of European developments, as the Executive Branch has been doing these past 
months. Vv e shall miss it unless we begin first by recognizing the total situation 
which confronts us in Europe. 
Seen in that tight, the changes on that continent raise for the foreign 
poticy of this country three great problems: (l) to provide the leader ship which 
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which will preserve and str engthe n the ins titutions o£ common action which have 
already been established among the free nations; (2) to recognize the dangers 
inherent in the ne w Soviet tac tics and at the same time to seize the oppor tunities 
which they may also create; and (3) to facilitate the unification of Germany and 
to insure the continuance of its bas i c t i e s with the We stern nations. 
Mr. President, I know that these problems are easie r stated than met. 
Yet, it is not impossible to delineate the outlines o£ a p::>licy that might meet 
them . I list in conclusion some of the elements which I believe are e ssential to 
such a policy: 
l. VIe should be prepared to offer the Good Offices of the United State s 
in a search for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question. 
2 . We should support the prompt inclusion of Spain, Tunisia and Morocco 
in NATO and the latter two in the United Nations. 
3. We should consider sympathetically any reasonable r e quest which 
emanates from France and is supp::>rted by bona fide nationalist leaders in 
Algeria for assistance in ending the conflict in that region. 
4. We should urge a frank, formal and full- scale reexamination of the 
strategic concepts and the financial and manpower requirements of NATO, 
while at the same time this country reexamine s its own foreign aid program. 
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5. We should convene, as I hav e long urged, an economic conference 
of the NATG nations with a view to increasing commerce as amo ng ourselves 
and establishing uniform standard s for trade with the Soviet bloc, recognizing 
that if we fail t o do s o , we shall run the risk of undermining necessary 
restrictions in a mad scramble for markets in that region. 
6. We should be prepared, on a mutually beneficial basis, to offer 
extensive c o operation in nuclear matters to Euratom, if it is established, and 
we sho uld make clear the terms of our offer promptly. 
7. If circumstances permit, we should increase the size of our 
diplo matic missions m the Eastern European countries, to the end that we may 
be more fully informed on trends in that area. 
8. We should extend the provisions of legislation involving surplus 
a g ricultural stocks to the Eastern European countries, provided there is 
a#~t~~:fc,~ these countries, recognizing 
that the children and the destitute must be exempt frcm conflicts of ideologies 
in any po licy which is worthy of this country. 
9 . We should recognize frankly the resistance to rearmament in 
Germany and reassess the need for it within the context of the negotiation of sound 
agre ements o n disarmament. 
